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Abstract 
We use an experimental market with externalities to test whether inequality aversion could help explain the popularity 
of earmarking tax revenues. We find that voter opposition is not fully explained by material self-interest: Results 
indicate that preferences for fairness influence voting behavior, with greater inequality in tax revenue distribution 
negatively affecting the acceptability of the tax. In addition to this, we also discover a significant degree of tax-aversion 
in the votes. Our findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of the positive impact that 
earmarking has on the acceptability of Pigouvian taxes.
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1. Introduction 
Despite successes with incentive-based policies, such as the congestion charges in 
London and Stockholm, they still face considerable skepticism from the public. In particular, 
proposals for new gasoline taxes are met with strong opposition. This sentiment limits the 
ability of policymakers to implement a relatively simple instrument that can effectively 
address externalities.  The literature, however, offers hope for Pigouvian taxes by indicating 
that earmarking tax revenues can increase the public acceptability of the tax (Schuitema and 
Steg, 2008; Hsu et al., 2008; Thalmann, 2004).  Earmarking, by mitigating public opposition, 
may relax the constraints and open the doors of more effective policy.  The success of 
earmarking, however, depends on a better understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of 
earmarking and Pigouvian taxes.  
Since Buchanan’s (1963) seminar paper that explained earmarking in a consumer-
decision framework, research efforts have identified issues such as preferences for specific 
over general spending programs (McCaffery and Baron, 2003; Baron and McCaffery, 2004), 
the need for a logical link between taxation and spending (Deroubaix and Lévèque, 2006; 
Kallbekken and Aasen, in press), and trust in government (Dresner et al., 2006; Goode, 1984). 
The issue of heterogeneity in externalities has largely been overlooked. The omission is 
relevant because the absence of heterogeneity inherently ignores distributional preferences, 
which have been shown to influence decisions in many settings (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  
Herein we address this issue by conducting a series of experiments that examine how 
preferences for fairness may explain, in part, the positive effect that earmarking tax revenues 
has on the acceptability of Pigouvian taxes. 
That fairness matters for the acceptance of environmental policies, as it does for other 
policies, has been documented (see, for example, the overview article by Johansson-Stenman 
and Konow, 2010). However, while efficiency is often relatively easily defined, fairness is a 
more elusive concept. We use two metrics to investigate inequality aversion in the context of 
Pigouvian taxes. We look at how the distribution of tax revenues and the distribution of tax 
impacts affect the acceptability of Pigouvian taxes. The experimental method is particularly 
useful for our investigation because the lab offers control over the heterogeneity of 
externalities and the alternatives in the referenda, while also using induced values that 
mitigates some of the issues associated with secondary data.1
 
  
2. Experimental design 
Our experiment consists of a market in which some buyers impose external costs on 
others through their purchases of a fictitious good. After trading periods without taxation, the 
buyers participate in six votes, in which they face binomial choices between different taxes on 
the polluting units with different rules for how to return the revenues. Votes serve as an 
indicator of an individual’s acceptability of the alternative tax proposals. The allocation of 
revenues can be interpreted as a transfer to the members of specific groups. Though we model 
this as a lump-sum transfer, earmarking revenues in practice could take other forms, such as 
directing revenues from congestion charges for road improvements. 
Each market consists of five (human) buyers and one (automated) seller. The seller’s 
marginal cost is 20 tokens; the buyers have resale values of 140, 110, 80 and 50 tokens for the 
four units they wish to purchase.  We employ a variation of a uniform-price multi-unit auction 
(Smith et al., 1982). In each market period, the buyers first indicate their willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for one unit, and then the seller sets the uniform market price equal to the lowest WTP 
above the seller’s marginal cost.  All buyers with a WTP above the uniform price are asked 
                                                 
1  Indeed, previous experimental work has provided new insights on the role of voting outcomes on tax 
compliance (Alm et al.,1999) and the differential impact of direct and indirect taxes on the likelihood of voting 
in favor of redistribution (Sausgruber and Tyran, 2005). 
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how many units of the good they want to buy, while all buyers with a WTP below the market 
price (and therefore below marginal costs) automatically purchase zero units in the period.  
The five buyers can be either “polluters” or “non-polluters,” and either “victims” or 
“non-victims.” Therefore, heterogeneity exists along two dimensions.  In each group, there 
are four different types of buyers. Figure 1 shows the four types and the direction of external 
costs. 
Of the five buyers, two are “bystanders” (type 4), one is “polluter” (type 3), one is 
“victim” (type 2), and one is “polluter-victim” (type 1).  Whenever type 1 and 3 buyers 
(polluter and polluter-victim) purchase one unit of the good, it results in an external cost of 20 
tokens for each type 1 and 2 buyer (victim and polluter-victim).2
 
 In periods with taxation, the 
Pigouvian tax rate is set at 40 tokens (20 tokens damage for each of the two victims). 
Figure 1: Direction of externalities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the equilibrium without taxation, all buyers purchase four units each at a price of 20 
tokens, but the socially optimal outcome calls for type 1 and 2 subjects to buy only three 
units.  The socially optimal outcome can be achieved by introducing a per-unit tax with a rate 
equal to the marginal damage caused by each unit.  
The subjects vote on four different tax regimes in six pair-wise votes. In the first ten 
periods, no tax is levied on any of the subjects, and a pure market game is played. There are 
votes on taxation in periods 11, 14, 17, 20, 23 and 26.  The regimes differ with respect to how 
the revenue is allocated, as illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Tax regimes 
Tax regime Description 
No tax (N) No tax implemented 
General (G) Pigouvian tax implemented with revenues redistributed to all subjects 
in equal lump-sum payments.  
Polluters (P) Pigouvian tax implemented with revenues redistributed only to types 1 
and 3 – the polluters. 
Victims (V) Pigouvian tax implemented with revenues redistributed only to types 1 
and 2 – the victims from the pollution. 
 
The general tax regime (G) is representative of a non-earmarked use of tax revenues—
independent of who caused the pollution and who suffered from it; the revenues are returned 
                                                 
2 Note that when a type 1 buyer purchases one unit it will not only reduce the gains of other participants of type 1 
and 2, but also reduce her own gain by 20 tokens. Technically, a buyer inflicting a cost on herself would not 
cause an “external” cost, but for reasons of symmetry and parsimony we do not call the self-inflicted cost an 
internal cost for buyers of type 1. This distinction does not have an impact on the equilibrium predictions and the 
social optimum. 
Type 1 
“polluter-victim” 
Type 3 
“polluter” 
Type 2 
“victim” 
Type 4 
“bystander” 
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to the general public in the form of lump-sum payments. The polluter tax regime (P) 
redistributes tax revenues to polluters, which corresponds to a case of compensating the 
polluters to minimize the cost to (and opposition from) polluters. The victim tax regime (V) 
redistributes the tax revenues to victims, which follows the rationale that victims should be 
compensated for incurring the cost of pollution, even if the level is efficient. Under this 
regime, the victims receive two benefits from the tax: a reduction in pollution due to the tax 
and the receipt of earmarks from the tax. 
Note that tax regimes P and V share the important property that the benefits accrue to 
specific groups along the same divisions as the externality problem itself (polluters and 
victims). This specification of earmarking revenues from a Pigouvian tax links the issue of 
earmarking more directly to the issue of public support.  
Table 2 shows the predicted payoffs for the different subject types under the four 
different tax regimes (at the equilibrium price). These payoffs are based on consumer surplus, 
external costs suffered (types 1 and 2), taxes paid (types 1 and 3) and, depending on subject 
type and tax scheme, share of tax revenues. For example, consider the Polluters scheme: the 
subjects of types 1 and 3 buy three units and get a consumer surplus of 270 (= 120 + 90 + 60) 
and they pay a tax of 40 per unit, for a total tax payment of 120. But they both receive half of 
the tax revenues, 120 again. In addition, the subject of type 1 suffers external costs of 6x20 
tokens, so she has a total payoff of 150 (=270-120+120-120), while the subject of type 3 
receives a payoff of 270 (=270-120+120).  Subjects of types 2 and 4 neither pay tax nor, 
under this tax scheme, receive tax revenues. But they materialize consumer surplus on a 
fourth unit, which is the reason why their payoffs are 30 tokens higher than those of the other 
types.  The payoffs for the other tax schemes are calculated accordingly. 
The table also displays the sum of payoffs across the five buyers and Gini indices for 
the distributions of overall payoffs and of tax revenue recycling.   
Table 2: Payoffs by type, Gini coefficient for payoff distribution and for revenue allocation for 
each tax regime. 
 
Tax 
regime 
 
Type 1 
 
Type 2 
 
Type 3 
 
Type 4* 
 
Sum of all 
payoffs 
Gini 
payoff 
Gini revenue 
allocation 
No tax 140 140 300 300 1180 0.163 - 
General 78 228 198 348 1200 0.230 0 
Polluters 150 180 270 300 1200 0.148 0.6 
Victim 150 300 150 300 1200 0.150 0.6 
Note: *There are two subjects of type 4 in each group. 
 
A few aspects of Table 2 are noteworthy. First, each tax regime increases overall 
efficiency, as measured by the sum of all payoffs, by only 1.7 percent relative to the no-tax 
baseline.  This is motivated by the typical case in which an environmental policy has a 
relatively small, albeit measurable impact.  Also, the benefits and costs of each tax system are 
unevenly distributed among the four types.  The impact on Type 1 (polluter-victim) buyers 
depends on the tax regime, with lower payoffs under General and higher under Polluter and 
Victim. Type 2 (victim) buyers always gain from a tax, though to different degrees across tax 
regimes.  Type 3 (polluter) buyers always lose, and Type 4 (bystander) buyers are only 
impacted by the distribution of tax revenues, not the pollution. 
Second, the General tax regime seems to be the most egalitarian regime because the 
tax revenues are distributed as a lump-sum, independent of the type of buyer. Thus the Gini-
coefficient for the distribution of tax revenues is 0.  This impression of an egalitarian outcome 
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can be deceiving, however, since the final payoff distribution is not only impacted by the 
allocation of tax revenues, but also by who pays the tax, the level of externalities and the loss 
in consumer surplus. Under the General tax regime, final payoffs for Type 1 buyers are 
reduced relative to the no-tax baseline, which exacerbates the already low position they faced 
in the no-tax regime due to the externalities. Final payoffs of Type 4 buyers, one of the types 
with the highest payoffs in a market without tax, are increased under the General tax regime.  
Thus, while the General tax scheme has no variation in tax revenue distributions, it causes 
considerable variation in the final payoffs. Indeed, the General tax regime has the lowest Gini 
coefficient for tax revenue distribution among the four tax schemes and the highest Gini 
coefficient for payoff distribution.  If subjects care about egalitarian motives, then the 
question arises whether they are more concerned about the distribution of tax revenues or the 
final distribution of payoffs.  
The experiment was conducted at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) with 120 
student participants (average age 23, 46% females, around 1/3 study economics and 1/3 study 
other social sciences). It was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). There was a total of six sessions; each session included four independent 
markets with five subjects each and lasting about 80 minutes. Subjects earned on average €22 
Euro (= $28 at the time of the experiment) including a show-up fee of €6. 
 
3. Results 
Voters faced six different votes—three between two alternative tax schemes and three 
between a tax scheme and no tax. Each vote entails different expected payoffs, payoff 
distribution and revenue distribution. Table 3 shows the support for each tax scheme in each 
of the votes by type. The numbers in parenthesis show the predicted outcome based on each 
type’s material self-interest. A bar symbols that the two taxes yield the same outcome for the 
type in question, and that subjects should be indifferent from a material point of view. While 
subjects voted in line with their material self-interest to some extent, there are also some 
striking significant deviations from the predictions. For instance, support for taxation is 21 to 
71 percentage points lower than predicted in columns 2-4 (where there is a No tax option), 
whereas in the four cases where support for No tax is predicted, fully 92% of votes do support 
No tax in three of the cases. 
 
Table 3: Results of the votes and predicted votes shares by type 
 
------ Support for tax ------  Support for G  Support for V N 
Type N v. G N v. P N v. V  P v. G V v. G  P v. V 
 1 8 % 29 % 33 %  17 % 21 %  58 % 24 
 (0%) (100%) (100%)  (0%) (0%)  (-)  
2 67 % 42 % 79 %  83 % 25 %  67 % 24 
 (100%) (100%) (100%)  (100%) (0%)  (100%)  
3 8 % 25 % 8 %  33 % 75 %  38 % 24 
 (0%) (0%) (0%)  (0%) (100%)  (0%)  
4 79 % 29 % 35 %  81 % 81 %  60 % 48 
 (100%) (-) (-)  (100%) (100%)  (-)  
 
To investigate whether inequity aversion may explain the popularity of earmarking of 
revenues, we estimate a set of linear probability models that defines voter support (a yes vote) 
as a function of the payoff distribution and revenue distribution. In each model, we control for 
a voter’s expected payoff and any individual- and period-specific effects.  In addition to this, 
models 1 and 2 control for inequity aversion, model 5 controls for tax aversion (voting against 
taxation when taxation is in the subject’s material self-interest), while models 3 and 4 control 
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for both. As we do not know whether subjects are more concerned about the distribution of 
tax revenues (models 1 and 3) or the final distribution of payoffs (models 2 and 4) we explore 
both options. Table 4 reports the estimates. 
 
Table 4: Panel estimates for voting models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Constant 0.3743 0.3154 0.4222 0.4344 0.4712 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Payoff 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Revenue distribution -0.2123 -- -0.1225 -- -- 
 (0.000)  (0.075)   
      
Payoff distribution -- 1.7069 -- 0.6041 -- 
  (0.000)  (0.181)  
      
No Tax -- -- -0.0959 -0.1620 -0.1938 
   (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
      
χ2 194.12 174.90 196.71 194.87 193.01 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
χ2 [var(u) = 0] 10.11 8.64 10.34 10.17 10.03 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
N 720 720 720 720 720 
 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is the individual subject’s vote (yes=1; no=0). 
(2) Estimates employ linear probability specification; results are robust across alternative specifications. 
(3) Individual and period-specific effects are accounted for in the estimation; Hausman tests indicate a  
preference for a random effects specification. 
(4) P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Estimates from Model 1 indicate that inequity in tax revenue distribution negatively 
impacts voter support (p=0.000), while Model 2 reveals the unexpected result that inequity in 
payoff distribution positively impacts voter support (p=0.000). However, the latter result may 
be due to tax aversion because a review of the data reveals that voters tended to prefer the no-
tax option over taxes that both yielded a more equitable payoff distribution and were in the 
voter’s own material interest. To disentangle tax aversion from inequality aversion, we 
estimate voting models that controlled for the presence of a no-tax option (Models 3-5). 
The results suggest that tax aversion is an issue. In models 4 and 5, the presence of a 
no-tax option has a significant negative effect on voter support (p<0.001). The estimated 
coefficient in Model 3 is also negative but fails to be significant at conventional levels 
(p=0.131)—likely an artifact of the correlation (0.81) between no tax and revenue 
distribution.   
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Revisiting our main hypothesis with controls for tax aversion, the estimates reveal that 
voter support remains negatively influenced by inequity in the tax revenue distribution, 
though with lower statistical and economic significance (p=0.075). We find that voter 
behavior is not significantly influenced by the payoff distribution (p=0.181), contrary to the 
unexpected positive effect when not controlling for tax aversion. 
 
4. Discussion 
Our results suggest that preferences for fairness influence voting behavior. Examining 
voting behavior over alternative earmarking schemes, we find that greater inequality in tax 
revenue distribution negatively affected the acceptability of the tax.  Results reveal no 
evidence that tax acceptability is influenced by the inequality of outcomes from taxes. Voters 
therefore appear to express egalitarian motives when considering the distribution of tax 
revenues, not the distribution of final payoffs.  While we find that voter opposition is not fully 
explained by material self-interest, this unexplained component cannot be fully characterized 
by preferences for fairness. We also discover a significant degree of tax-aversion. Our 
findings provide greater understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of the positive impact 
that earmarking has on the acceptability of Pigouvian taxes. 
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